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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

II.

Defendant/Appellant Helmut Robert Tacke (“Tacke”) wanted to

The property had

business on his property near Salmon, Idaho.

water, a bottling facility,

water,

but

he

needed

and

a pipeline

to

capital

company got

get

W.

Plaintiff/Respondent Christopher

a $500,000 investment

between the two. Tacke

started.

So,

in

to an organization afﬁliated With the Trust.

Tacke

also

March

had the know-how

2013,

in exchange,

also agreed to

a water-bottling

natural springs that produced

he

James Trust (the “Trust”). Under the

from the Trust and,

start

struck

ample

to bottle the

a

deal

With

deal, Tacke’s bottling

conveyed most of Tacke’s land

pay the money back two years

later

With interest, in March 2015. But Tacke would not simply pay the principal and interest in U.S.

currency—the deal required him
If Tacke could not timely

in Tacke’s

to

pay a combination of gold,

silver,

and Australian Dollars (“AUD”).

pay the amount due, the Trust’s credit would

persist but convert into equity

company.

However, shortly

after the parties signed

an unartfully drafted agreement, the Trust’s trustee,

Christopher James, and his associate inexplicably ripped out Tacke’s human-grade water line and

replaced

it

With a system designed to irrigate

.

This meant Tacke lacked both the quality and quantity

of water needed to develop the business. Without income from selling bottled water, Tacke was unable

to

pay the debt on time. Even though the contract called

for the debt, the Trust ﬁled this lawsuit,

seeking $500,000 in damages, rather than the value of the gold,

silver,

and

AUD. The Trust then

ﬁled

two summary-judgment motions, neither of Which Tacke’s previous counsel defended and both of
Which the

district court granted.

interest, attorney fees,

Appellant’s Brief

and

The

result: a

judgment against Tacke of over $650k

in principal,

costs.
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new

Tacke’s

District

and an

counsel (undersigned) appeared and ﬁled a motion to reconsider, which the

Court denied

earlier

as

untimely. Tacke appeals from the denial of that motion for reconsideration

one ﬁled by

his prior attorney.

III.

BACKGROUND

Factual Background

A.

Tacke,

Who

is

in his eighties

to develop a mineral water

and does not speak English

company on

his land near

Salmon. (R.

as a ﬁrst language, has

at 261.)

He

is

a

long wanted

German immigrant

With no formal postsecondary education, no legal training, and no schooling in English.

(Id.)

In the

19803, Tacke bought 374 containing several natural springs (the “Original Property”). (R. at 262.) In

2000, Tacke built a water pipe nearly a mile long from a spring on to a small bottling

the Original Property (the “Original Mainline”).

Idaho Mineral Springs,

LLC

(Id.)

facility,

both on

Nevada company,

In 2011, Tacke formed a

(“IMS”) to own and operate What Tacke hoped would someday become

a successful beverage water business. (Id.) Tacke, unsophisticated in legal matters, did not understand

that he should have transferred the land

and business

assets to

IMS

and therefore never did

so. (Id.)

In late 2012 or early 2013, Tacke began working on a deal With Christopher James, the Trust’s

trustee, to sell

(“Firstfruits”),

most of the Original Property
Which

is

to a

non-proﬁt called

Wholly controlled by James and

Firstfruits

his Wife. (R. at 319.)

The

Foundation

Inc.

deal also called for

the Trust to invest $500,000 in Tacke’s water bottling business. Although this investment

is

referred

to as a “loan” throughout the record (including Tacke’s brieﬁng), the parties’ transaction does not

fairly

resemble a loan.

To
instead

start,

the parties discussed that Tacke

would make quarterly

Appellant’s Brief

interest

would not “repay” a loan

payments and then

a ﬁnal

in the

normal sense but

lump-sum payment

at the

tWO-year
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mark. Those payments were not to be calculated based on the original $500,000 investment. Instead,

James wanted

to determine the quantity of gold, silver,

and

AUD

that, in equal proportions,

were

worth $500,000 on the date of the investment. Then, Tacke would make interest payments and a ﬁnal

payment equal

to the

market value of those quantities of each commodity

James wrote on March
James

(R. at 273.)

13, 2013, the “[l]oan

later testiﬁed

is

now

as

of the payment dates. As

valued in the 3 commodity/currency, not

he wanted the two—year payment calculated

this

USD.”

way because he

expected the U.S. Dollar to weaken against the value of these commodities, thereby increasing the

ultimate

payment amount.1

The

deal between

(R. at 320.)

Tacke and the Trust

also did not resemble a typical loan because

for the Trust’s investment to eventually con‘vert to

80%

equity in

IMS

the tWO—year payment. (R. at 263.) Accordingly, as James wrote on

receive

80% of IMS

that the debt

would “convert

would take equity

On March

called

Tacke did not timely make

March

13, 2013, the

Trust would

“in exchange for $500,000.” (R. at 274.) In another email that day, he explained

into

20% of ownership
The

to additional equity over time. (R. at 273.)

the Trust

if

it

in addition to

14, 2013, the

day

in [IMS],”

and continue

to gradually “convert”

record contains no communications suggesting that

payment.

after the above—described emails, the parties executed a written

agreement entitled “Agreement Concerning Helmut Robert ‘Bob’ Tacke’s Property

in

Lemhi County,

Idaho” (the “Agreement”), which contains only two pages of substantive terms to govern a multi—

parcel land deal

1

Tacke acknowledges that a ﬂoating currency

distinction
2

and an investment transaction with multiple parties? (R.

A

between commodities and currencies

copy of the Agreement

immaterial attachments.

Appellant’s Brief

is

attached as

like
is

AUD

is

at

275—76.)

The Agreement

not generally considered a “commodity,” but the

immaterial to this case.

Appendix

1 for

the Court’s convenience.

Addendum

1

omits certain

A full version of the Agreement is in the Record on Appeal at page 275.
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states that

Tacke would transfer 364 of the 374 Original Property

Firstfruits

paying off certain mortgages on the property. (R.

the Trust

silver

would “lend” $500,000

to

IMS, but

that

“IMS

will

and Australian Dollars (‘AUD’), one third each.” (R.

acres to Firstfruits in return for

The Agreement then

at 275.)

states that

repay the Loan in a combination of gold,

at 276.) It

speciﬁes the following quantities

of each commodity upon Which the payment amount Will be calculated, Which

at the

time of the

contract together were purportedly worth $500,000:

0

105.485 ounces of gold;

0

5,847.93 ounces of silver; and

0

161,500

(collectively the

AUD

“Commodity

The Agreement

Basket”).

provides that quarterly interest would be

“paid on the combined value of the gold, the silver, and the

AUD.”

(Id.)

Consistent With the parties’ pre-contract discussions, the Agreement also states that the

$500,000 payment was “secured by 80% of the ownership of IMS.” (R.
repaid by

Trust

March

15,

2015, then the

20% of ownership

Agreement does not say

in

IMS

“Loan

Will

on March

that the debt

15,

The Agreement does

3

The

suggests the

attorney

Trust in

who

40%

as a debt,

and

to

IMS

20% ownership on March

equity

transfers in 2015

When Tacke

Agreement

is

Will transfer to the

15,

2017.” (1d,)

and 2017;

it

The

does say,

is

last transfer, either.

be written by a layperson, the record (and the Agreement

Agreement was drafted by the Trust’s attorney at the time.3

drafted the

“Loan” was not

passes or in 2023, Which ever

not state that the debt would survive this

Although the Agreement appears

itself)

2015 and

would survive the equity

however, that the Trust Will receive another

ﬁrst. (Id.)

remain standing

at 276.) If the

different from,

and not believed

(R. at 276, 321.) Tacke,

to be connected to, counsel for the

this litigation.

Appellant’s Brief
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whose ﬁrst languages
relied

on

are

German and Dutch,

his previous attorney,

did not understand

Randolph Neal,

Tacke plowed the $500,000

to review

it.

much of the document and

(R. at 261, 264.)

into his water—bottling operation. (R. at 264—65.) Unfortunately,

shortly after the parties executed the Agreement, a

control, tore out Tacke’s Original Mainline

man named

and replaced

it

With a

Steve Adams, and people under his

new water system designed primarily

to irrigate Firstfruit’s acreage, not to transport potable spring water. (R. a 143, 327—28.)

allegedly acted

on behalf of

Firstfruits

work

in his capacity as a Firstfruits principal

328, 331.) Although James and

Adams

and another organization, the Youth Employment Program,

both ofwhich were developing the land in a joint-venture relationship. (R.
allegedly approved the

instead

Adams knew

that a

at 143,

When, not

as

327—28, 331.) James

Trust trustee. (R.

human—grade water supply was

critical to

Tacke’s

business, neither bothered to get Tacke’s consent to destroy his line. (R. at 144, 256, 265, 328.) It

unclear on this record

why James and Adams

Tacke’s system With theirs would save them

another spring. (R.

at

did this to Tacke, but

money and

is

appears they believed replacing

effort versus

running a different line from

327—28.)

The system Adams

installed

is

unusable for bottling water. (R. at 265.)

dramatically reduced water

ﬂow to

below What Tacke needs

push water through

was unable to run

it

at

to

levels

his bottling business

payment due under the Agreement.

below Tacke’s water right entitlement and
his ﬁltration system. (R. at 266.)

and earn the income needed

(R. at 266.)

To

to

make

this day, Firstfruits has

Adams

has also

to pressure levels

Consequently, Tacke

the

March

15,

2015,

not replaced Tacke’s

Original Mainline. (R. at 266.)

Appellant’s Brief
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Procedural History

B.

1.

The Pleadings

The Trust ﬁled this lawsuit against Tacke in January 2017, followed by an Amended Complaint
alleging breach of the Agreement, seeking

32—33.)

The Amended Complaint

damages

also sought

for the

damages

for the quarterly

accruing under the terms of the Agreement. (R. at 33—34.)

and attorney
denied

fees.

liability for

receive equity in

Tacke answered through

unmade March 2015 payment.

It

(R. at 13,

“prejudgment interest”

stated no other claims except for costs

his previous counsel,

Randolph Neal. (R.

Tacke

at 50.)

damages under the Agreement and instead asserted the Trust was entitled only

IMS

in

exchange for failing to make the March 2015 payment. (R.

at 54.)

Tacke

to

also

asserted seven counterclaims primarily seeking remedies for the destruction of Tacke’s water system.

(R. at 54—58.) Tacke’s previous counsel never attempted to bring claims against Firstfruits, the

Employment Program, James,

2.

or

Adams

for

Youth

damaging the water system.4

The Motionsfor Summaryfudgment and

the

2018 judgment

Although some written discovery and depositions occurred, Attorney Neal did precious
to

defend Tacke in

this case. In

little

February 2018, the Trust ﬁled a motion for summary judgment on

its

breach-of-contract claim, asking for $500,000 in damages. (R. at 74, 91—92.) Neal ﬁled nothing in

response and instead appeared

District

on

its

Court denied. (R.

at the

at 95.)

The

hearing to ask for more time to do discovery—a request the

District

Court granted summary judgment

contract claim, awarding $500,000 in damages. (Id.)

4

The

Trust

following day, Neal ﬁled a Rule 56(d)

As of the date of this brief, Tacke’s counsel is ﬁnalizing a complaint to be ﬁled
Employment Program for Violating Tacke’s water rights and ditch rights.

Appellant’s Brief

in favor of the

against Firstfruits and the

Youth
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motion

to delay the District Court’s decision, but naturally such a

District

Court did not enter a judgment under Rule 54(a)

Then,

in July 2018,

the Trust sought

motion was too

as a result

late.

(R. at 97.)

The

of that summary—judgment ruling.

summary judgment

in

its

favor on

all

Tacke’s

counterclaims. (R. at 106—14, 145—46.) Again, Neal did not resist the motion. Instead, he asked to

withdraw

as

Tacke’s counsel but did not notice a hearing for the withdrawal motion as required under

the Civil Rules. See I.R.C.P. 11.3(b)(1) (requiring a Withdrawing attorney to set the motion for hearing

and give notice

to the client).

Neal

also did not ask for a delay so

Tacke could ﬁnd a different lawyer

before the District Court dismissed his counterclaims. (R. at 147—51.) Unsurprisingly, on August 21,

2018, the District Court entered

152.)

summary judgment

against

Tacke on

That same day, the Court entered a Rule 54(a) judgment

Judgment”). (R.

interest. It also

at 154.)

dismissed

Tacke’s counterclaims.

his counterclaims. (R. at

in favor of the

The 2018 Judgment awarded $500,000
all

all

in

Trust (the “2018

damages plus postjudgment

The 2018 Judgment

did not address the Trust’s

substantive claim for the quarterly interest payments accruing under the terms of the Agreement. (Id.)

Motionsfor

3.

On

Costs, Fees,

and Prejudgment

Interest

August 29, 2018, three signiﬁcant things happened.

Reconsider (the “First Reconsideration Motion”). (R.

relied

on deposition testimony

to argue that the parties

equity, not that the Trust could collect

this

at 158.)

money damages.

First,

The

Neal ﬁled a Motion

First Reconsideration

to

Motion

had agreed Tacke’s debt would convert
(R. at 158—59.)

The

District

to

Court denied

motion, reasoning that Tacke was attempting to modify the terms of an unambiguous contract

With inadmissible parole evidence. (R.

at 215—17.)

Second, the Trust ﬁled papers seeking attorney fees and

Appellant’s Brief

costs. (R. at 197.)
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Third, the Trust ﬁled a Motion for Prejudgment Interest. (R. at 200.)

interest

motion sought $136,027.40

under the Agreement. (R.

as

damages

at 196, 200.)

for the

The Trust

The prejudgment—

unpaid quarterly interest payments accruing

attached

its

calculation of interest

damages

to

its

declaration in support of costs and fees. (R. at 196.)

Tacke’s motion to disallow the Trust’s costs and fees was due by September 12, 2018, but Neal
did not ﬁle such a motion. See I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) (requiring a motion to disallow to be ﬁled within

fourteen days of the ﬁling of the

that the District

memorandum

of costs and

fees). It

was not

until

September

Court allowed Neal to Withdraw and stayed the case for 21 days. (R.

14, 2018,

at 208); See

I.R.C.P. 11.3(c)(2) (requiring a 21—day stay after an attorney Withdraws). Neal also did not ﬁle any

opposition to the Trust’s motion for prejudgment interest before withdrawing. In

Tacke appearedpro

on

it.

se

and ﬁled

a second

2018,

motion for reconsideration, but the District Court never ruled

(R. at 212—18.) Tacke’s pro se motion for reconsideration also argued that the contract between

the parties called for Tacke’s debt to convert into equity if the

made. (R.

at

March 2015 payment was not timely

212—13.)

The 2019]udgment

4.

The undersigned appeared for Tacke on January 14, 2019.
23, 2019, the District

costs

November

and

at 224.)

(R. at 219.) Shortly after,

Court granted the Trust’s motion for prejudgment

fees. (R. at 221.)

The Court

also entered

an

Amended Judgment

interest

costs

and

fees.

Critically,

it

its

request for

(the “2019 Judgment”). (R.

As With the 2018 Judgment, the 2019 Judgment awarded $500,000

and additional amounts for

and

on January

also included a

for the debt “principal”

new damages award of

$136,027.40 for contractual prejudgment interest—the ﬁrst time the interest claim was resolved in a

Rule 54(a) judgment.

Appellant’s Brief
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The Third Motion for Reconsideration

5.

Fourteen days after entry of the 2019 Judgment, Tacke ﬁled a document unfortunately
the “Second

at

226—27.)

damages,

Motion

for Reconsideration

and for Joinder” (the “Third Reconsideration Motion”). (R.

The Third Reconsideration Motion asked

costs,

and

fees against

damages, only equity,

if

Tacke

the Court to overturn the judgment for

Tacke because the Agreement does not allow the Trust

to recover

March 2015 payment.

The Third

failed to

make

the

(R. at 236—36.)

Reconsideration Motion argued in the alternative that the Agreement was ambiguous

the Trust’s credit converted into equity. (R. at 236.)

Tacke could present a mutual-mistake defense
was not entitled to a return of the
based on the value of the

titled

USD

It

as to

Whether

next asked to overturn the 2019 Judgment so

236—38.)

at trial. (R. at

It

further contended the Trust

$500,000 plus interest on that amount, but only to payments

Commodity Basket,

the value of Which was unproven. (R. at 236—38.) Last,

the motion sought to overturn the award of costs and fees because the Trust should not be the

prevailing party. (R. at 244.)5

Before the Trust could respond, the District Court ordered that the Third Reconsideration

Motion was untimely.

(R. at 295—96.)

Under I.R.C.P.

fourteen days of a “ﬁnal judgment.”

The

District

11.2, a

Court allowed both

sides to ﬁle supplemental

brieﬁng on the underlying claims and defenses

as untimely. (R. at 354.)

Court reasoned that the 2018 Judgment was ﬁnal even though

The motion

also asked to

must be ﬁled Within

to reconsider. (Id.) After a hearing, the

but ultimately issued a similar order dismissing the motion

5

to reconsider

Court ruled the 2018 Judgment was a “ﬁnal

judgment” that started the fourteen-day clock on a motion
District

motion

it

The

District

omitted the award of $136k in

reopen counterclaims related to the destruction of Tacke’s pipes, but Tacke

is

not pursuing

those matters on appeal.

Appellant’s Brief
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prejudgment interest damages that ﬁrst appeared

in the

2019 Judgment. (R.

at

354—55.)

The Court

then held that a challenge to the prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney fee awards was untimely

under Rule 54(d)(5) because Tacke did not ﬁle a motion to disallow
days of the August 2018

Memorandum

Tacke appeals from the
of costs and

fees.

of Costs and Fees. (R.

costs

and

fees Within fourteen

at 355.)

District Court’s refusal to overturn

its

damages awards and the awards

Since the Third Reconsideration Motion was timely, the issues of Whether the Trust

should have prevailed on

claims were properly presented to the District Court.

its

The

District

Court

should therefore have overturned principal and interest damages because the Agreement does not

allow the Trust to collect

Tacke

to

go

to trial

money damages.

on the

issue of

should also be allowed to go to

trial

Whether

a

judgment resolving

all

to interpret the

it is

ambiguous. Tacke

on a mutual—mistake defense.

ON APPEAL

the Third Reconsideration Motion, Which was ﬁled Within fourteen days of

damage

claims,

was timely.

Whether the Agreement converted the

2.

Agreement because

ISSUES PRESENTED

IV.

1.

how

In the alternative, the District Court should have allowed

Trust’s credit into equity in

IMS when

the

March 2015 payment was not made.
Whether the

3.

defense at

District

Court should have allowed Tacke to

assert a mutual—mistake

trial.

4.

Whether the

of the Trust after

5.

Appellant’s Brief

as a result

District

Court should have vacated the award of

costs

and

fees in favor

of overturning the 2019 Judgment.

Whether Tacke

is

entitled to attorney fees

on appeal under LC.

§

12—120(3).
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

V.
In this case, the issue

Whether the District Court correctly denied three motions for

is

reconsideration brought under I.R.C.P. 11.2 (formerly Rule 11(a)(2)), one of Which the District Court

did not rule on. Ruling on the motions was not a discretionary matter. “The district court has no

discretion

on Whether

to entertain a

the court must consider any

new

interlocutory order.” Fragnella

motion for reconsideration

.

.

.

On a motion for reconsideration,

admissible evidence or authority bearing on the correctness of an

Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266, 276, 281

7).

.

P.3d 103, 113 (2012). However, a

motion for reconsideration “need not be supported by any new evidence or authority.”]ackson

Crow,

7).

164 Idaho 806, 811, 436 P.3d 627, 632 (2019) (quotation omitted).

The

reconsideration motions challenged

breach-of—contract claim for the

summary judgment

March 2015 payment and prejudgment

was simply being asked to re-run a summary-judgment
reconsideration, the district court

deciding the original order that

analysis.

The

interest.

“When

must apply the same standard of review

its

Court

District

deciding the motion for

that the court applied

being reconsidered.” Fragnella, 153 Idaho

is

Trust on

in favor of the

at 276,

281 P.3d

When

at 113.

Thus, “[t]he summary judgment standard applies to a motion to reconsider the granting of a motion

for

summaryjudgment.” Fagen,

1198 (2016).

Under Rule

genuine dispute

as to

Inc. v.

Lava Beds Wind Park, LLC, 159 Idaho 628, 633, 364 P.3d

56, the District

any material

fact

Court may grant summary judgment only

and the movant

is

entitled to

judgment

as a

if

“there

1193,

is

no

matter of law.”

I.R.C.P. 56(a).

This Court freely reviews the District Court’s decisions.

decision to grant or

deny a motion

for reconsideration, this

Court

“When

reviewing a

utilizes the

same standard of review

used by the lower court in deciding the motion for reconsideration.” Greenwald
Idaho 929, 938, 436 P.3d 1278, 1287 (2019) (modiﬁcation and quotation omitted).

Appellant’s Brief

trial court’s

7).

W.

Sur. C0., 164

“When

the district
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summary judgment and then

court grants

denies a motion for reconsideration, this Court must

determine Whether the evidence presented a genuine issue of material

judgment. This means the Court reviews the
novo.” Idaho First Bank

‘v.

Bridges,

district court’s denial

fact to defeat

summary

of a motion for reconsideration de

164 Idaho 178, 186—87, 426 P.3d 1278, 1286—87 (2018) (modiﬁcation

and quotation omitted).

ARGUMENT

VI.

First,

untimely.

It

the District Court erred in denying Tacke’s Third

was ﬁled within fourteen days of the ﬁnal judgment

Motion

in this case

Second, the District Court erred in granting the Trust’s motion for

for Reconsideration as

and was therefore timely.

summary judgment on

claim because the Agreement unambiguously provides that the remedy for non—payment

debt converts to equity in IMS, not damages. Third,

unambiguously converts the Trust’s debt
the case should be

remanded

regardless of Whether the

mutual mistake

at trial,

to equity, the

to the District

Agreement

is

Court for

silver,

award of costs and

A.

The Third

and

the Court does not agree that the

fact

that the

Agreement

ﬁnding on the Agreement’s terms. Fourth,

prove—or put

upon Which damages must be based.

fees should

is

Agreement should be deemed ambiguous and

something the District Court’s ruling did not permit.

AUD

contract

ambiguous, Tacke should be permitted to present a defense of

erred in awarding damages because the Trust failed to

of the gold,

if

its

forth

Fifth, the District

Court

any evidence—on the value

Finally, if

Tacke

prevails here, the

be vacated because the Trust Will no longer be a prevailing party.

Reconsideration Motion

Was Timely

Because A11 Claims for Relief

Were Not

Resolved Until the January 2019 Judgment

The
because, as

District

it

Appellant’s Brief

Court incorrectly deemed the 2018 Judgment

said, the

award of prejudgment

interest in the

to be the ﬁnal judgment in this case

2019 Judgment was “derivative” of the
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$500,000 damages award in the 2018 Judgment. But

until all claims for relief are resolved,

damages under a

contract. It

this

Court has held that

and the prejudgment—interest claim

was therefore a claim for

relief that

a

judgment

in this case

is

not ﬁnal

was a claim for

was not resolved

2019

until the

Judgment.

A party can
motion

is

move

to reconsider

any interlocutory orders—no matter how old—so long

as the

ﬁled within fourteen days of a ﬁnal judgment. “A motion to reconsider any order of the

court entered before ﬁnal judgment

may be made

at

any time prior

trial

to or within 14 days after the entry

of a ﬁnal judgment.” I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, “until a ﬁnal judgment has been

entered,

an

granting

order

reconsideration.” Puckett

lapse in time

‘v.

summary judgment

Verska, 144

an

is

interlocutory

order

and

subject

to

Idaho 161, 166, 158 P.3d 937, 942 (2007). “Regardless of the

between the entry of an invalid ﬁnal judgment and the ﬁling of the motion

to reconsider,

if

no ﬁnal judgment existed

is

timely.” Wickel v. Chamberlain, 159 Idaho 532, 537, 363 P.3d 854, 859 (2015) (modiﬁcation added).

Except for

partial

at the

time the motion to reconsider under [Rule

judgments certiﬁed under Rule 54(b)

standard for deciding Whether a judgment

1086, 1087 (2015) (citing I.R.C.P. 54(a)).

been entered on

all

ﬁnal. See Cook

Under

the Rule, a

7).

begin With the words

document must be

judgment

titled

ﬁled, the motion

Rule 54(a) prescribes the

Arias, 164 Idaho 766, 767,

claims for relief, except costs and fees, asserted

action.” I.R.C.P. 54(a)(1). Further, the

recital

is

as ﬁnal,

11] is

is

only ﬁnal

by or

against

if

“judgment has

all

parties in the

“‘Judgment’ or ‘Decree.’”

“‘JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS

.

.

.,’”

435 P.3d

Id. It

must

and “must not contain

a

of pleadings, the report of a master, the record of prior proceedings, the court’s legal reasoning,

ﬁndings of fact, or conclusions oflaw.”

Id.;

accord

Doe

7).

Doe, 155 Idaho 660, 663, 315 P.3d 848, 851

(2013).

Appellant’s Brief
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The 2018 Judgment

could only be ﬁnal

if “all

claims for

relief,

except costs and fees” were

resolved at that point. I.R.C.P. 54(a)(1). If claims by or against any parties remained unresolved, the

judgment was merely
(2014).

For example,

interlocutory. Agrisource, Inc.

in Taylor v. Riley, 162

7).

johnson, 156 Idaho 903, 912, 332 P.3d 815, 824

Idaho 692, 403 P.3d 636 (2017), the

trial

two judgments that were deemed nonﬁnal because they adjudicated some, but not
action. Id. at 703,

all

403 P.3d

at 647.

The judgments

the claims in the action in a third judgment.

Likewise, in this case, the 2018

did not become ﬁnal until the

judge entered

all,

trial

claims in the

court dismissed

Id.

Judgment did not

resolve

all

claims in the action.

The Trust

brought a claim for breach of contract, seeking damages for accrued interest under the terms of the

Agreement. (R.
relief

at

33—34.)

on the Trust’s claim

The 2018 Judgment
for the

did not adjudicate that claim, but instead only granted

unpaid “principal” amount owing under the Agreement. (R.

Accordingly, prior to January 24, 2019, at least one claim remained unresolved.

that the District

It

was not

at 154.)

until then

Court issued the 2019 Judgment adjudicating the Trust’s substantive claim for

prejudgment interest damages. Thus, only on January 24, 2019, did the Court’s judgments became
ﬁnal. See Taylor, 162 Idaho at 647, 403 P.3d at 703 (stating that the three judgments

When

all

claims were adjudicated). Tacke’s Third Reconsideration

2019, Within the fourteen—day

was entitled to challenge

The

District

all

Window allowed by

became ﬁnal only

Motion was ﬁled on February

I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)(1).

The motion was

7,

timely and he

previous orders in this action.

Court nonetheless reasoned that the Trust’s claim for interest was “derivative” of

the $500,000 damages claim, akin to an award of “costs and fees” under Rule 54. However, this Court

in an analogous situation has ruled that

prejudgment

from

LLC

litigation expenses. Infackson

Appellant’s Brief

Hop,

72.

interest,

Whether contractual or not,

Farm Bureau Mut.

1723.,

is

distinct

158 Idaho 894, 354 P.3d 456
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(2015), this

had

to

Court decided that prejudgment

interest

was not among the “expenses” of arbitration that

be asserted during the arbitration under the Uniform Arbitration Act.

Id. at

897, 354 P.3d at

459. This Court stated:

Prejudgment
Interest

is

interest

is

not an expenditure suffered in the conduct of the arbitration.

‘compensation ﬁxed by agreement or allowed by law for the use or detention

of money, or for the loss of money by one
interest

is

Who

is

entitled to

its use.’

Thus, prejudgment

compensation that can be awarded to a party in arbitration,

it is

not an

expense incurred by that party in the conduct of the arbitration.
Id.

(quoting BLACK’S

prejudgment interest

and

is

LAW DICTIONARY

598 (7th

a substantive claim that can

be awarded

fees of pursuing litigation. Since the Trust’s claim for

until the

West

ed.,

if this

to review the ﬁrst

for reconsideration,

Which

ruling on

among

the costs

later

was timely.

Agreement was simply

The second motion

This Court

is

respectfully urged

also challenged the District Court’s rulings

in favor

of the Trust.

The

ﬁrst motion

to memorialize a purchase of an interest in

IMS.

to reconsider raised a similar argument. (R. at 212—13.) Since at worst

only the ﬁrst motion for reconsideration was timely, and

B.

at 158.)

Agreement was unambiguous and should be construed

(R. at 158.)

not

case,

Court deems the Third Reconsideration Motion was untimely, the ﬁrst

two motions

to reconsider argued that the

is

this

prejudgment interest remained unresolved

motion for reconsideration ﬁled on August 29, 2018, was. (R.

that the

in litigation. It

2019 Judgment, Tacke’s motion for reconsideration fourteen days

In any event,

in

Similarly,

1999)).

summary judgment was

in error, the

damages,

as

costs,

explained below, the District Court’s

and

fees

award should be reversed.

The Agreement Unambiguously Does Not Allow the Trust to Recover Money Damages
Missing the March 2015 Payment Because the Debt Converted to Equity

for

The Agreement’s

the

plain

wording provided that the principal debt was

March 2015 payment was not timely made, but

Appellant’s Brief

the

remedy for missing

that

to

remain

as a

payment was

debt

if

for the Trust
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to receive equity in

IMS. Thus, the

District Court’s

damages award

for $500,000 plus interest does

not square With the contract.

“The purpose of interpreting a contract

to

is

determine the intent of the contracting parties

the time the contract was formed.” Thurston Enters., Inc.

435 P.3d 489, 497 (2019). The ﬁrst question

is

7).

Safeguard Bus.

Whether the contract

is

Sys., Inc.

ambiguous.

,

164 Idaho 709, 717,

“When interpreting

a contract, this Court begins With the document's language. In the absence of ambiguity, the

must be construed
plain

in

its

plain, ordinary

wording of the instrument.”

interpretation of an

and proper sense, according

Phillips

‘v.

unambiguous contract

to the

Gomez, 162 Idaho 803, 807, 405 P.3d 588, 592 (2017). The

is

an issue of law subject to free review. City ofMerz'dian

reasonably subject to conﬂicting interpretations. Determining Whether a contract

question of law over which this Court exercises free review.” Boise Mode,

Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 108,

contract

is

found ambiguous,

Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho

294 P.3d

its

1111,

is

money damages

and

IMS

will transfer to the

ownership on March

15,

Trust

the Trust’s credit into equity after

According

by 80% of the ownership of IMS.”

by March

2015, “then the

20% of ownership

in

IMS

Loan

will

(Id.)

ambiguous

is

Donahoe Pace

is

a

{9°

Thunder Spring—

on March

However,

if

IMS

to the

2017—the Trust
Agreement, the

(R. at 276 (emphasis

remain standing

15,

2017.” (Id.) After that, the Trust Will obtain another

2023 or When Tacke passes away.

Appellant’s Brief

a question of fact.” Bakker v.

in addition to that equity.

Trust’s “Loan” of $500,000 was “secured

added).) If IMS did not repay the loan

7).

one that

P.3d 332, 337 (2005) (quotation omitted).

The Agreement unambiguously converted
therefore cannot collect

LLC

is

is

7).

1120 (2013) (quotations and citations omitted). “If a

interpretation

185, 190, 108

document

meaning derived from the

299 P.3d 232, 242 (2013). “An ambiguous contract

Petra Ina, 154 Idaho 425, 435,

at

as a debt,

2015 and another

40% of equity

20%

in either

timely makes the March 2015 payment, then
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the Trust receives no equity. Taking this

“secures” the debt under the

into equity starting in 2015

end of the period, the debt

agreement—if the debt

and ending

is

together, the

all

in 2023.

is

Agreement

says that the

80%

interest

not timely and fully paid, the debt converts

During that time, the debt remains standing;

at the

discharged.

This interpretation of the Agreement

is

the only reasonable one.

To

read the contract as the

Trust does would be to ignore the “secured” language, Which implies the equity in

IMS would

be

transferred to the Trust to satisfy the debt, and not merely as a penalty for late payment. See Burns

Concrete, Inc.

‘v.

give meaning to

Teton Cm‘yq 161 Idaho 117, 120, 384 P.3d 364, 367 (2016) (stating that the Court must

all

provisions in the writing to the extent possible).

proved, damages for not receiving the equity in

Judgment

C.

in favor of the

Trust to the extent

it

IMS. Accordingly,

awards damages,

If the

as to

What the Trust’s remedy

is.

money damages, then

is

contract term

is

it is

interest, costs,

and

fees.

to Equity, the

is

nonsensical.” Potlatch Educ. Ass'n

LLC

Appellant’s Brief

7).

to equity,

ambiguous When there are two different reasonable interpretations or the

z).

Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633,

document and gives the words or phrases used

Props.,

Is

What the Agreement means.

is

Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 832, 291

226

patently ambiguous, a court looks at the

their established deﬁnitions in

or settled legal meanings. In determining patent ambiguity, the contract as a Whole

Buku

Agreement

ambiguous and the District Court’s

for a factual determination as to

P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010). “To determine Whether a contract
face of the

Court should vacate the 2019

not apparent from the terms of the document

In that case, the Agreement

judgment must be vacated and remanded

language

sought, let alone

Court does not agree that the Agreement unambiguously converts the debt

thereby precluding a suit for

“A

this

Agreement Does Not Convert the Debt
Whether the Debt Converts to Equity

Alternatively, If the

Ambiguous

The Trust never

is

common

use

considered.”

P.3d 1027, 1031 (2012).
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If the

Agreement does not

plainly convert the debt to equity, thereby precluding a suit for

damages, then there are two plausible readings of the agreement.

A debenture

debenture.

DICTIONARY, Debenture

some other

Some

(11th ed. 2019).

is

it is

company.

Id.

merger or

simply a debenture convertible into stock under certain conditions.” Kessler

might convert into equity expressed

recapitalization,

Courts interpret debentures

contract, the interpretation of

Indus. Corp.

‘v.

Wang

Restaurants, Ina,

LAW

So, for a corporation that issues stock,

LLC

as a

that does not issue

percentage ownership. In any event,

convertible debt instruments “are issued for a variety of reasons, such as to raise

facilitate a

as a convertible

debentures allow a creditor to convert the debt into

General Cable Corp, 155 Cal. Rptr. 94, 99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). For an

stock, the debenture

read

company’s unsecured debt. BLACK’S

just an instrument evidencing a

security, such as stock in the debtor

“a convertible debenture

7).

is

One way to

and

like

to

fund venture

new

capital, to

capital situations.” Id.

any other agreement. “A debenture indenture

is

essentially a

which involves the application of contract law principles.” Kardolrac

Labs., Ina,

482 N.E.2d 386, 388

Ct.

(Ill.

App. 1985);

see also

Becker

v.

North’s

967 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]his case turns on the interpretation of

the particular terms of the convertible subordinated debenture agreement

Here, a reasonable interpretation of the Agreement

is

that,

.

.

.

.”).

taken as a Whole,

it is

a convertible

debenture that mandatorily converted the debt into equity after the second 20% transfer in 2017. The

Agreement
the

states that the equity transfers “Will”

Agreement identiﬁes the 80% equity

happen Whether the Trust

as “security.” (R. at 276.) If

2015 payment, the “Loan will remain standing as a debt,” and

by another 20% on March

IMS

20% of the

elects

them or

failed to

15,

will survive the

second equity transfer in 2017. Then, the next sentence states that

Appellant’s Brief

15,

the

March

equity “Will” transfer to the

Trust on March

2015, followed

make

not. Again,

2017. (Id.)

Nothing says that the debt

40% more

equity
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will transfer in the future,

that last transfer.

but again, nowhere does the document state that the debt would survive

A term specifying Whether the debt survives these equity transfers would be expected

in a debenture transaction,

Which

is

usually “massively documented.” Katz

v.

Oak Indus.

Inc.

508 A.2d

,

873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).

In addition, the Agreement does not explain

how Tacke

after 2017, indicating that the future equity transfers are in

Agreement

is

silent as to

2015

the

if

an additional

Agreement

as

It

would be nonsensical

40% of IMS

for

still

Tacke

occur even

to

if

Tacke paid the debt

make any payments

equity would transfer in 2023 anyway. Thus,

it is

after

March

reasonable to read

exchanging debt for equity over time ifTacke missed the March 2015 payment date.

This Court should therefore rule that there

equity.

exchange for debt. In other words, the

Whether the transfer in 2023 would

owing under the Agreement.

could avoid further equity transfers

The Court should

is

an ambiguity

as to

Whether the debt converts to

vacate the damages, costs, and fees award, and

remand the

case for further

proceedings.

The Court Should Permit Tacke

D.

If this

should

trial

still

to Present a

Mutual-Mistake Defense

Court determines that the Agreement might require Tacke

overturn the judgment in favor of the Trust on

its

on a mutual—mistake defense. “[M]utual mistake permits

as

long as the mistake

v.

Harger

Comm,

is

so substantial

and fundamental

pay money damages,

a party to rescind or

as to defeat the object

modify

of that party.

a contract

”

O’Connor

Ina, 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008) (modiﬁcation in original).

satisfactory evidence.” Dennett

7).

Kuenzlz',

it

breach claim and permit Tacke to go to

party asserting a mutual mistake bears the burden of proof to

Appellant’s Brief

to

at Trial

show the mistake by

“clear

The
and

130 Idaho 21, 27, 936 P.2d 219, 225 (Ct. App. 1997).
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“[A] mistake

is

an unintentional act or omission arising from ignorance, surprise, or misplaced

conﬁdence.” Leydet

‘v.

A

a classic example.

drafting error

Whole or

is

City

ofMountain Home, 119 Idaho 1041, 1044, 812 P.2d 755, 758 (Ct. App. 1991).

in part fails to express the

“Where

agreement because of a mistake of both parties

or effect of the writing,” the court

CONTRACTS

§ 155.

though the mistake

(Ct.

App. 1985)

Further, “the

a writing that evidences or embodies an agreement in

may reform

the document.

remedy of reformation may be

as to the contents

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

available for

mutual mistake even

a product of negligence.” Aitken v. Gill, 108 Idaho 900, 902, 702 P.2d 1360, 1362

is

(citing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 0F CONTRACTS

§

155 cmt.a).

In this case, both the Trust and Tacke believed they had an agreement for the Trust’s unpaid

debt to convert to equity in IMS.

On March

13, 2013, the

day before he signed the Agreement, James

emailed Tacke and the Trust’s attorney, Michael Oswald. James requested that the contract include a

term for “the transfer of 80% of Idaho Mineral Springs

to the

CW James Trust

.

.

.

in exchange for

$500,000.” (R. at 274.) Later that day, James wrote that the loan would “convert” to equity over time.

(R. at 273.) In his deposition,

He

of IMS.” (R. at 321.)

Q:

.

.

.

James testiﬁed he understood “the $500,000 was

further testiﬁed:

At the end of two

three

to purchase 80 percent

years if he

is

not able to repay the

full

amount according

to the

commodity currency—

A:

Right.

Q:

—then

the loan Will

Will convert into

still

have—the loan

Will

20 percent of ownership

still

in the

have loan standing

but

it

loan Will have a debt, but

it

as a debt,

company?

Right.

Q:

So What does—What did you mean by

that?

You

said:

The

will convert.
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Well, we’ll say

A:

convertible venture [debenture].

this: It’s a

convertible note. So if he didn’t pay

could be treated as a

It

off and if he couldn’t pay

it

it off,

that

I

would

take a 20 percent ownership in his company.

(R. at 35.)

James’s statements are consistent With Tacke’s understanding that the Agreement converted

the debt to equity, not that equity

would be extracted

as a penalty. (R. at 263.)

This agreement was

fundamental to the contract because of the beneﬁt the Trust would enjoy—and the repercussions Mr.

Tacke would experience—if Tacke was personally

The Court should
trial

E.

on

his

therefore, at

minimum,

liable for

vacate the 2019

money damages

in the event of default.

Judgment and allow Mr. Tacke

to

go to

mutual-mistake defense.

The Damages and Prejudgment Interest Awards Should Be Overturned Because
Did Not Prove the Value of the Commodity Basket
The

District

prejudgment

interest,

Court awarded $500,000

Which was calculated

at

damages

in

5% per

damages should be overturned because the Trust

is

year on

to

the Trust,

USD

plus

the Trust

$136,027.40 in

$500,000. (R. at 224.) These

entitled only to the value of the

Commodity

Basket, which remains unproven.

Proof of causation and amount of damages are
claim. Mosell Equities,

LLC

7).

“[C]ompensatory damages are deﬁned

sustained,

and nothing more; such

or injury.” Todd

omitted).

‘v.

Damages

59°

Bemyhill

Sullivan Comt.

as

any breach—of—contract

Idaho 278, 287, 297 P.3d 232, 241 (2013).

C0., 154

damages that Will compensate the injured party for the injury

as Will

simply make good or replace the

LLC, 146 Idaho

118, 123, 191

loss

caused by the wrong

P.3d 196, 201 (2008) (quotation

recoverable for breach of contract are those that arise naturally from the breach

and are reasonably foreseeable.

Silver Creek Computers, Inc.

672, 677 (2002). Typically, the measure of damage

Appellant’s Brief

essential elements of

is

“a

7).

Petra, Ina,

136 Idaho 879, 884, 42 P.3d

sum of money that Will,

to the extent possible,
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put [the

plaintiff] in as

good a position

as

he would have been in had the contract been performed.”

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 0F CONTRACTS
Here, the measure of damages

interest calculated

is

§

347 cmt.a.

the value of the

Commodity Basket on March

on the value of the Commodity Basket

at various points in time.

15,

2015, plus

The Agreement

did not state that Tacke would repay the debt in U.S. dollars, but instead would “repay the Loan in a

combination of gold,

silver

Agreement speciﬁed the

and Australian Dollars (‘AUD’), one third each.” (R.

quantities of each

commodity

must be paid

that

at 276.)

The

to the Trust. (Id.) It then

provided that interest would accrue “on the combined value of the gold, the

silver,

and the AUD.”

(Id.)

This interest would accrue until the debt was discharged in March 2017, the date of the second

20%

equity transfer.

Since the Trust has never submitted proof on the value of the

it

has not proven the damages element of its breach claim. This

James admits, the U.S. dollar gained signiﬁcant strength,

would drive down the money owed
interest calculated

in the record.

on that amount,

The Court should

The Award

USD

$500,000, plus

by the Agreement, and unsubstantiated

therefore overturn the damages and prejudgment interest award and

require proof of the value of those commodities if damages are appropriate at

F.

any time,

Australian dollar, Which

Thus, an award for

excessive, not supported

at

particularly problematic because, as

at least as against the

to the Trust. (R. at 320.)

is

is

Commodity Basket

all.

of Costs and Fees Should Be Overturned Because the Trust Should

Not Be

a

Prevailing Party

The main
damages award

is

thrust of the Trust’s case

was

overturned on appeal, then the Trust

costs. See I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(C)

damages under the Agreement. If

its

no longer the prevailing party entitled

to

to recover

is

(mandating certain costs to the prevailing party); I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B)

(allowing the Court to select a prevailing party). Moreover,

Appellant’s Brief

if

the Trust

is

not the prevailing party,

it
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is

not entitled to the attorney fee award under

§

fees only to the prevailing party). Accordingly, this

fees if

it

§

12—120(3) (mandating attorney

Court should vacate the Trust’s award of costs and

vacates the damages awards for any reason.

ATTORNEY FEES

VII.

If this

Court overturns the award of damages

case for further proceedings

fees.

LC.

12—120(3). See

in favor of the

on substantive claims, then Tacke

will

Trust and does not remand the

be the prevailing party entitled to

Rule 54 conveys discretion in selecting the prevailing party. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B).

not fully win on

claims to be the prevailing party. Cf. Collins

all its

v. jones,

131 Idaho 556, 559, 961

P.2d 647, 650 (1998) (ﬁnding a party to have prevailed even though she did not Win
requested); Walton, Inc.

7).

A party need

all

the damages

App. 1999)

jensen, 132 Idaho 716, 721, 979 P.2d 118, 123 (Ct.

(similar).

Further, the Court can apportion costs and fees in cases Where a party prevailed in part and did not

prevail in part. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B).

Although Tacke has not prevailed on

his counterclaims, the

main

thrust of this case was defending against the Trust’s breach—of—contract claim. If he avoids liability for

the signiﬁcant

sums the Trust

seeks, then

Tacke has prevailed on the chief claim

in the suit

and should

be deemed the prevailing party.

Tacke respectfully requests attorney
statute

mandates attorney

transaction.

LC.

§

on appeal under LC.

fees to the prevailing party in

any

12—120(3); accord Security Investor Fund LLC

1036, 1046 (2019).

A

commercial transaction

household purposes.” LC.

§

12—120(3).

question of law. Sil‘verWing at Sandpoint,

1114—15 (2018). This case

Appellant’s Brief

fees

is

is

Whether

LLC

‘v.

‘v.

civil

§

12—120(3)

if

he prevails. That

action involving a commercial

Crumb, 165 Idaho 280,

,

443 P.3d

any transaction other than one for “personal or
a case arises

from a commercial transaction

is

a

Bonner Cnty., 164 Idaho 786, 794—95, 435 P.3d 1106,

undoubtedly a commercial transaction because

it

involves an agreement
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to invest in or loan

No

money

to

aspect of the transaction

someone developing

District

Court erred

money judgment; and

it

it

incorrectly

trial.

Finally, if

Tacke prevails

and Tacke should be awarded

Dated October

11,

262—67.)

incorrectly determined that the Third

Agreement

awarded damages and prejudgment

Commodity Basket at any point

Court holds that the Agreement does permit the

the case should nevertheless be

it

incorrectly determined that the

because the Trust did not prove the value 0f the

if the

at

CONCLUSION

in several respects:

Reconsideration Motion was untimely;

Trust to a

commercial bottling operation. (R.

undertaken for either party’s personal or household purposes.

is

VIII.

The

a

trust to seek

entitled the

interest

amounts

in time. Additionally,

money damages under the

contract,

remanded so Mr. Tacke may present a defense of mutual mistake
in this appeal, the Trust’s

his attorney fees

under LC.

award of

§

costs

and

at

fees should be vacated

12—120(3).

2019

MOONEY WIELAND PLLC

Q‘s»

M/C

Wlelandy
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Certiﬁcate of Service

I

certify that

0n October

11,

2019,

I

caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellant’s

Brief to be served on the parties to this action or their counsel Via the Idaho iCourt System as set forth

below.

Bryan D. Smith
SMITH, DRISCOLL

8:

ASSOCIATES,

PLLC

bds@eidaholaw.com
Attorneysfor Plaintz'ﬂ/Respondent

gé»

M
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MORTONRem d

‘

e}

EDWARDS, Demm-

)

("Firs’nruits’ ’)

James Trust, UDT February 7, ‘1979

(the

I

rust”)

Recitals:

Heimut-Rnbert' “Bub"Tacke own32374~Acres on sixcontiguous parceis in‘Lemhi County, 'idaho,
.as ‘further-rdescr’ibed .-in ithe

attached ‘201'1 -Lemhi' County-Assessment“Notices, Attachment A.

Bab Tacks aiso ownsa'nd .operates

.ida’hoMineral:'Springs,r LLC' ("1M8"),

‘a'Nevada Limited

’

Liability‘ﬁumpany.

1M8 occupies approximateiy 31'0 .0:‘ihe 374 acres
particulariy ﬁes: ribed

‘IMS operates

in.

an

as

[r3352 zezair: nets],

(the

“1M8

existing ‘1200"square“foot buiiding,

radditionai buildings ‘tobe-"erected

on

"the

IMS

Site”).

Those

-

acres are more

and haspians t0 expand

into

two

Site.

‘Bob Tacke owes approximately U. S. $75.6 DUDLDO on the B74 acrc-s
second mortgage

The “First: Mortgage, held .by-“Security Finan‘ciat
'tatemeni of Account, Attachment C, Land

1RD

Attachment B.

via aﬁrst

mortgage and a

Services, 'islevidenced'by 1he‘ Borrower’s

has-‘a'

March

15,

201 3 payoff amount

o'f

U .‘S;$55D,DOOJ‘OO.
TheriisecondsMortgahge, heldhy Hot Springs Retreat,.LLC,

Agreement, Attachment D, .and. has aiMarch

is

evidenced bythe Escrow

1 5, 20123 payoff amuunt of U.S;‘$205,539;66.

Aareement:
'Finsﬁruits

Bob
Site.

’

.acke

Th9

201.3.

willpay offthe‘ﬁrst.and‘second mortgages n0 Eaterth'an March 15,2013.

will

transfer to Firsu‘ruits ﬁtle to the

tiﬁe transfer wiH take ,piace

384 .of the 374 acres; he win

as soon as reasonably

retain tiﬁe to the

possibie, but no tater than

WIS

May H,

-

Date:
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Th5 Hus:

ﬁend U. S $500, DUO OD to

wili

repay the Loan

[MS

for two years

U.S.$166,666.0D converts

into

The Trust Wm transferthe
or”

o?

5,847.93 ounces

mteresz (me. 'Lsan

gokd at today s

ra'rs— or” L2.

of sikvar at U.S.$28.5io:.

AUD withihe‘$1.032 USD

,U.-SL‘$166,667.00 converts into 161,500

80%

5%

)

1M8

will

a combination of goid siwer and Auszraizan Dol‘.ars’K 'AUD") ens. third each

In

U. F3 $166 656. DO converts into 105 «485 osunce

by

at

.U.S.$5.DD,ZOOO.DD

‘co

IMS no

later‘than

C .331580/0:

or"

siiver

and

= $1.000 AUD.

March

'25,

2013, to be secured

the ownership 0f IMS.

[MS win pay 1.25% interestat‘the end of each “three month period measured'from March'ﬁ,
201 3. interestlwill be paid 0n the combined value of “ch5- g‘old,"the-Siiver, .and the AUD. IMS
does not re‘P'ay‘the: Loan no tater thanMar‘ch ‘1'5, ‘20 “£15,:then me .Loanzwil! remain standing as-a
debt .and'WlS will transferzto the Trust‘ZD" of ownership. in [MS on March '15 22015 andﬁ2'0%
ownership on March 15, 20 ’17. As of March 1gggg, the Trust win own 40% of. IMS. The Trust’s
Bob’s passing (whxchgvéegwcomes ﬁrst) at
ownership win remain at 40% until March 1'5, 26+?)
YT"

v

’o.

7

which iime [MS

will

transfer

an

additional

40% to the

,

Irust

.U

IHMS

.paysthe Loan off inﬁll! .byiMarch

Bob Tackeintends

for

his remaining

.15,

201-5,“the Trust

20% ownership

Sineinikova ("Olga") .upon hispassing.

Bob Tacks

in

wm not: have any oWnership‘in 'IMS.

IMSiobe transferred

to his Wife, Olga

retains the right t0 transfer‘ths‘.20% to

persons otherthan Oiga. Upon'trans‘fer to 'Oig‘a orother persons (“Other Transferees”), ”this
ownership
'

Wm

not

haveany management

.the right of ﬁrst'refusal- in'the'event D‘iga'or

‘in‘the (event

“the

20%

Other Trans'fereeswish to seik‘any or

Olgazzpredeceases Bob Tacks and he is incapacitated

ownership (or such iesseramount

that

Olgasowns)

wit!

rat

20%

IMS will have

rights or duties, or 'any voting rights.

all‘of'tha

20%

theiime‘of harnessing,

transfer in'equa! portions to

Dkgais children w‘no 'arealive :as'o'f'the date ofther passing. Up'on'transfer'to Ofgafs child or
'chitdren, This

WIS

ownership

wilihave the

will‘not

'right'of

have anymanagement Tights 'or duties, 'orzany‘ voting Tights.

ﬁrst refusai in the

eventany child wishes

t0 seilr'any or

ail .of

his 0r

her

ownership.

Thesagreement has been prepared by'Michae! S.Oswald,
attorney for Firstfruitsand The Trust Bub Tacke has been-advised to seek independent ie‘gal
counsel to-ensure his rights are adequateiy'pmtected.

This-is alsgaliybinding agreement.

This agreement keggoverned
interest kaws

of.

.by

the iaws

20f

the-State of idaho, without regard tothe conﬂict 0f

the state. Anydispute regarding

this

agreement

shall

be heard

in

the state

i

cour‘r

‘

.in.Salmon,.Lemhi County, Idaho.

h)
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r
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l

.Mmb‘h-pw/xﬁ/L

HeimutRobert"80b”TacKe

n

r;

Firstfruits

--

.

‘fx/mw-K

f

1’

ojﬂ

{X/Mv

k;

Foundation Gnns‘ropher W. Jame s Trustee

#04 Via, I

,-

/

(j

x»

Wiﬁﬁ
/?,,//,.

‘

“)3

Cl

f1

I

p

The Christopher
Christopher W. James, Trustee

W...Jame'sL‘frust,

//

[2/

w

f

_

”d’I/[Wv

UDTFebruaw 7,

1.979

LL
-

9344,11;:LJ / 717L
0

Sworn ﬂ subscribed before me
This

#7:"

day
/

of

{W:Jr

,2013

/

‘I

,r

“Hick" Mg;MJI'W»

w

'

1!”

My commission

"HMS

M

'LOKTw/ﬁy

expires

(3314/9

Afr

”.4;

MIMUA

1’

,rL’l

,I'”

<‘

9’06

71m VJ} @Wcﬂ’é’

w
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1’

‘

t;

-~

DOROTHY LOWSE KOWARKO

1'

Notary Public
'
"wwrv-lﬁr-wr;

State

ﬂiépwg'

'of:-Inano
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